Paper by Kenneth H. Lokensgard

Theory/Stuff Divide
Kenneth H. Lokensgard, Department of Religion, Gettysburg College

"The Necessity and Consequences of Theory in the Academic Study of Religion or Theorists: Get Stuffed!"

In presenting this paper, I wish to make two main points. First, the divide between doing "theory" and "stuff" in the academic study of religion is overemphasized. Scholars regularly objectivize ideas about religion, effectively turning theories into "stuff." In fact, responsible scholars must do this, if they want their theories to be employed and tested as tools that may reveal something meaningful about religion. Sometimes, these newly objectivized ideas actually become the "stuffing" of religion. In the Christian theological tradition, for instance, ideas about God, which are certainly manifestations of theory, often become part of Christianity's constituent material. This occurs when they circulate beyond the theologian as independent things to be examined and perhaps adopted by others. Conversely, scholars who approach religion more empirically regularly turn the a priori "stuff" of religion into "theory." They do this necessarily, if unconsciously, when they interpret "stuff", before representing it in speech or in writing. The second point I wish to make is that the study of religion is most beneficial to members of the wider academic and popular world when its ideas are "thingified" or when it focuses upon the "stuff" of religion, in the first place. In other words, the study of religion is most beneficial when it produces theories that can be applied and tested by others (an obvious point to scientists, but one which is commonly ignored by scholars of religion) or when it offers interpretations of culturally locatable things.

As an ethnographer, I focus upon the a priori "stuff" of religion - culturally locatable things. Indeed, I focus upon Native American material culture, its perception, and treatment. I work with the Blackfoot peoples of Montana and Alberta to represent to the non-Indian public, traditional Blackfoot perceptions and treatment of ceremonial items.

I am going to say a few words about this work to help illustrate the points I am trying to make in this paper. Put simply, the Blackfeet consider their ceremonial materials, which are usually bundles of skins, rocks, plants, earth paints, pipes, and so on, as collections of living beings, who have vowed to help the Blackfoot peoples. The Blackfeet believe these beings are embodied in the bundled items. Thus, they treat the bundles with great care and respect.

Of course, most non-Indians perceive ceremonial materials as symbols, rather than embodiments, of other beings. Not surprisingly, non-Indians have placed in museums those ceremonial materials that have fallen out of Blackfoot hands and into their own and have treated the materials as anything but living. Only in recent years, have some non-Indian scholars begun to realize that their interpretation of these things has led to the mistreatment of ceremonial materials by museum curators, collectors, and others. From the Blackfoot perspective, such mistreatment has devastating consequences. The Blackfeet believe that mistreated bundles, imprisoned in collections, may become dormant or decide to aid the Blackfoot peoples no longer.

Thus, while I focus initially upon material culture in my work, my ultimate concern is with the perception and treatment of that material by all those who encounter it. Through an interpretive process that sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls "social phenomenology," I try to reveal how both Blackfeet and non-Indians theorize the ontological statuses of medicine bundles and other things in their worlds.

My work benefits others in several ways. It benefits the Blackfoot and other traditional, indigenous peoples by highlighting what they consider the mistreatment of their ceremonial materials. It benefits the academy by showing scholars that they may interpret material culture in radically different ways than do members of other religious societies. Scholars often take for granted that the ontological statuses of particular things remain the same across cultures; work such as mine reveals that this is not the case. The theoretical component of my work demands that scholars interrogate the conceptual categories into which they put the things they encounter in their studies. My ability to point toward actual "stuff" that is interpreted and treated differently in different cultural contexts reinforces this demand. I engage necessarily in theory and in the study of "stuff" to achieve what I hope is a meaningful and beneficial study of religion.

Now, I could just as easily, and perhaps as effectively, conduct my academic work in a less phenomenological and more deductive way. I could first theorize the ontological statuses of ceremonial materials in different cultures, before focusing upon the materials themselves. If I were to do this, I would probably be labeled a theorist of religion rather than an ethnographer of religion. Still, in order for my work to have any real relevance -- for it to impact indigenous peoples or my fellow scholars in any beneficial way, I would eventually need to apply and test my theories with in-depth case studies of the perception and treatment of real "stuff" in different cultural contexts.

The theologian, mentioned earlier, takes yet another approach in the study of religion and is not necessarily concerned with material culture, or "stuff" of any kind, at all. Many traditional, Western theologians do not think of God as a "thing." For them, God is a concept or idea that transcends the corporeal realm of humanity. For non-theologians, or for theologians who understand their work in less conservative terms, God may be something much more tangible and locatable. At the moment, however, I am only concerned with traditional, Western theologians and their conceptions of God. I will leave the exploration of "secular," "deconstructive" and other theologians and theologies to those who are better informed than I.

I suggested earlier that the study of religion is beneficial when it focuses upon the "stuff" of religion. So, does this mean I believe traditional, Western theology is a waste of academic time? Not at all. I also suggested the study of religion might benefit others when it becomes thingified, or turned into "stuff" itself. This often happens in theology. Theories of God are written up, argued over, examined, and represented in speech and writing. In other words, they are objectivized and circulated beyond the theologian. In this way, as I said earlier, theories of God actually become the "stuffing" of religion, Why is the "thingification" of theology - any theology -- beneficial? It is beneficial because it allows theology to be treated as the data of religion or to be applied and tested critically in other contexts by other scholars.

So far, I have discussed, in extremely broad and general terms, theologians who objectivize their theologies, scholars who theorize religion and test their theories with case studies, and ethnographers who interrogate the interpretation of material culture. I have argued that each type of scholar, regardless of his or her initial approach, is involved with both theory and "stuff". I have also argued that because of their involvements with both theory and "stuff", these scholars may contribute in a beneficial way to others. Who does this leave? This leaves at least two types of scholars. First, this leaves the scholar of religion who studies actual religious phenomena or things, but who never interrogates the interpretations of those phenomena or things - interpretations that may vary tremendously across cultures. This stubborn refusal to enter the realm of theory in a conscious way may lead to cultural misinterpretation, misrepresentation, and even mistreatment, as is the case with the misinterpreted Blackfoot bundles. There is also the scholar of religion who theorizes religious action, belief, or "stuff", but who never applies and tests those theories with in-depth case studies or who never even allows his or her theories to be objectivized and examined by members of a religious community. These are the scholars who, to use Bourdieu's words, refuse to "objectivize the subjective" and who become trapped in a sort of "social marginalism." Their theories might, I suppose, serve as inspiration to other, more disciplined scholars who will put those theories into practice. These marginal scholars, however, will never directly benefit anyone outside of the academy. Moreover, they will not be attractive to most academic employers, who want to hire professors who can provide substantive and practical information to students and to the members of the wider public. Few employers, I suspect, are interested in hiring professors whose overly subjective musings will keep them imprisoned in the "ivory tower," perpetuating the view of humanities professors as out-of-touch with the rest of society.

Now, some of you may say that you did not enter the study of religion to benefit others. Perhaps you believe we should pursue knowledge simply for the sake of knowledge. Perhaps you believe that, if we engage in religious studies with the explicit goal of benefiting others, we are moving beyond an academic, critical stance. This is always a danger in the study of religion. What I am essentially arguing, however, is that we should always balance subjectivity and objectivity in the study of religion. We should avoid being so purely theoretical that we become solipsistic, and we should avoid being so focused upon "stuff" that we overlook the need to interpret that "stuff" as consciously and carefully as possible. A failure to avoid such pitfalls results in a study of religion that is essentially masturbatory or which may be completely inaccurate.

I, for one, would like to engage in a study of religion that is critical and sophisticated, but which is grounded in reality. Judging by my experiences with the job market, I am not alone. I have talked to many academics seeking new hires, over the past few years, who have said that they are looking for candidates who can approach religion both theoretically and empirically and who can integrate these two approaches. Therefore, I urge those of you, who are still students, to take full advantage of the theoretical sophistication available in at Syracuse University. You are, fortunately, at a place where the necessity and consequences of theory are emphasized. Simply be willing to objectivize your theories, put them into practice, or otherwise remember their connection to the "stuff" of religion.

I have tried to show that the divide between doing theory and "stuff" is overemphasized. I have argued that, if the study of religion is to benefit others, the scholar must do them both, consciously, or must be willing to allow his or her theories to become "stuff." Of course, this is just my own theory, which I am ready and willing to objectivize. Treat my theory, then, as the "spectacle" that Bourdieu suggests all theory should be. Examine it, apply it, test it, and to see if it is of any benefit.